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The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Facilitation 








The Middle East and North Africa regions (MENA) trade performance over the past two 
decades has been disappointing. Efforts to boost trade through a plethora of regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) are underway. This study examines the potential contribution of 
regional trade agreements, as well as trade facilitation improvements in enhancing the 
development prospects of the region. Using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
model and database, both intra-regional integration and integration with the EU are 
observed to have a favorable impact on welfare in the MENA region. The welfare gains 
from integrating with the EU are observed to be at least twice as much as intra-regional 
integration. Furthermore, these welfare gains are observed to at least triple when the 
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The integration of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region’s economy into 
global economy through trade and investment flows is essential for the welfare, growth, 
and job creation prospects of the region. Triggered in part by the collapse of oil prices in 
the 1980’s, the share of MENA in global trade has declined sharply from about 8% in 
1981 to some 2.5% in recent years, thereby becoming one of the least integrated regions 
of the world (figure 1). This contrasts with the positive acceleration in the share of trade 
experienced by other regions. For instance, in 1985, MENA’s share in world trade (4.7%) 
was higher than East Asia Pacific (4.2%), however, by 2003, East Asia Pacific’s share in 
world exports was about four times higher than that of MENA.   
 
The dismal trade performance points to a lost opportunity in benefiting from integration 
with the rest of the global economy. Based on a constant market share analysis, if MENA 
maintained its 1985 share in world exports (which was already relatively low), it would 
have received some US$2 trillion in extra export revenues over the 1986-2003 period, or 
an annual average of some US$110 billion in export revenues. Compared to current 












1960  1962  1964  1966 1968  1970  1972  1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996  1998  2000  2002
MNA SSA SAS LAC EAP ECA  3
export levels (US$166 billion in 2002), the extra export proceeds would have made 
significant contributions to economic growth and job creation prospects in the region.  
This study will focus on how liberalization of MENA’s trade regime, within the context 
of the regional trade agreements, and trade facilitation reforms may help to revive MENA 
trade and thus contribute to welfare, economic growth and job creation prospects in the 
region.  
Regional Trade Agreements in MENA 
MENA countries are liberalizing their trade regime through various bilateral and regional 
preferential trade agreements. Indeed, this has evolved into a complicated web of 
overlapping trade agreements involving bilateral, sub-regional, and regional trading 
partners (figure 2).  
At the regional level, the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) is the most 
comprehensive agreements, with regards country coverage, though a host of other sub-
regional free trade agreements also exist (appendix 1).
2  In spite of efforts to promote 
intra-regional trade among MENA countries, intra-MENA trade remains low.  Using a 
gravity model, Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) estimate that overall intra-Arab trade should 
be 10-15 percent higher than what is observed. Miniesy, Nugent, and Yousef (2004), also 
using a gravity model, predict that if a full fledged free trade area among Arab countries 
of the MENA region were established, intra-MENA trade could be increased by another 
147 percent. These results, among others, raise the fundamental question as to why intra-
MENA trade is so low. Explanations found in the literature are policy-induced factors 
such as: restrictive trade policies, including tariff and non-tariff barriers; delays and costs 
in customs clearances; inhospitable investment climates; high transportation and 
communication costs; and the dominance of the public sector in MENA countries. 
                                                 
2 These include the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC); Mediterranean Free 
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Figure 2: Overlapping web of FTAs involving MENA countries    5
Fundamental structural factors such as similarity of production and export structures, 
differences in per capita income, and small size of the region tend to encourage more 
inter-regional trade rather than intra-regional trade. Furthermore, previous international 
economic sanctions (e.g. Iraq and Libya) and neighboring political tensions, such as 
disagreements among Maghreb countries concerning the Western Sahara, also constrain 
intra-MENA integration. Indeed, one study suggests that the socio-political problems are 
at the core of the lack of integration among Maghreb countries rather than economic 
fundamentals.  
More significant, perhaps, besides liberalization at the intra-MENA level, is the 
preferential liberalization with developed country trading partners. The most widespread 
in terms of country coverage are the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (EMA). EMAs are 
currently in force in Egypt (2004), Israel (2000), Jordan (2002), Lebanon (2003), 
Morocco (2000), and Tunisia (1998). An interim association agreement, with the 
Palestinian Authority, has been in place since 1997, and association agreements with 
Algeria (2002) and Syria (2004) have been concluded though yet to enter into force (see 
appendix 1 for further details). Negotiations are also ongoing for an EU-GCC free trade 
area. These agreements are part of efforts to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free-trade 
area, under the so-called “Barcelona Process”.   
Results of studies attempting to quantify the impact of RTAs in the MENA region are 
mixed. Most studies have used computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. While 
few studies obtain negative welfare effects (Brown et al, 1997; Hoekman and Konan, 
1999), in general, the results of the majority of studies suggest that, the static efficiency 
gains from tariff liberalization lead to small but positive net welfare effects, however, 
welfare gains are more significant when non tariff barriers (deeper integration issues) are 
taken into account. For instance, under a GAFTA cum EMA tariff liberalization scenario 
in a CGE model, Konan (2003), estimates the static welfare gains to Tunisia and Egypt to 
be about 3.03% and 0.01% of base income respectively. However, the removal of non-
tariff barriers imposing frictional costs on international trade transactions leads to a 
7.71% and 2.74% increase in welfare for Tunisia and Egypt respectively. Similarly, 
Rutherford, Rutstrom and Tarr (2000), using data for a “representative” Arab 
Mediterranean Country in a CGE model, show that eliminating  tariffs on all imports   6
from the EU results in a 0.1% and 1.6% increase in  welfare in the short-run and long-run 
respectively. However, when both tariff and non-tariff barriers are taken into account, 
including the harmonization of standards, and a more efficient trading environment, the 
welfare impact increases to 3.7% in the short-run and 4.7% in the long-run. Lastly, an 
earlier study on Egypt, using a CGE model, suggests that larger welfare gains from an 
FTA would result only from the elimination of regulatory barriers and red tape measures, 
and a shallow agreement would merely be trade diversionary and lead to a small welfare 
decline (Konan and Maskus 1997). 
Hence, even though tariff liberalization efforts, unilaterally or preferentially, are 
important in improving the price incentive structure for trade, increasingly, the 
importance of other trade-related complementary policies, such as, transport and 
telecommunication services, customs procedures, ports efficiency, standards and 
technical regulations, flexibility of factor markets, etc are being recognized as an 
important component in enhancing a countries trade performance. In other words, tariff 
reforms alone, though important, are insufficient in optimizing the potential contribution 
of trade to the development (welfare, growth, jobs etc) agenda. Hence, while considering 
the potential impact of tariff liberalization envisaged under the various free trade 
agreements, this study will take into account the contribution of improvements to trade 
facilitation on MENA trade and growth performance.  
 
Quantifying the Impact of Trade Facilitation: Brief Literature Review 
Recent quantitative studies on trade facilitation continue to show its importance. Using a 
probit model, Hummels (2001) estimates that each day saved in shipping time, in part due 
to faster customs clearance, is equivalent to about 0.5 percentage point reduction in ad 
valorem tariffs.
3 UNCTAD (2001), observes that a 1 percent reduction in the cost of 
maritime and air transport services in developing countries could increase global GDP by 
some US$ 7 billion. Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2002), using both OLS regression and 
probit models, observe that a 10 percent decrease in the bilateral price of phone calls is 
associated with an 8 percent increase in bilateral trade. Using a more comprehensive 
                                                 
3Admittedly, the benefit of each day saved to a trader will differ by product.  
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measure of trade facilitation (including indicators of port efficiency, customs 
environment, regulatory environment, and service sector) in a gravity model, Wilson, 
Mann, and Otsuki (2004) observe a $377 billion increase in global trade of manufacturing 
goods arising from improvements in trade facilitation. Furthermore they find that the 
response of exports to unilateral improvements in trade facilitation exceeds that of 
imports.  
All the above studies use partial equilibrium techniques and are somewhat limited in 
providing estimates of the welfare impacts of trade facilitation. Feeding estimates from 
Wilson et al. study into a CGE (GTAP) model, Hertel and Keeney (2005) observe that 
the combined global benefits from the liberalization of merchandise and services trade of 
$150 billion in welfare gains is boosted by $110 billion p.a. with the addition of trade 
facilitation.  Fox, François and Londono-Kent (2003) and OECD (2003) extended the 
analysis of trade facilitation within the GTAP framework by explicitly accounting for 
both direct and indirect trade facilitation costs. The former study observes that trade 
facilitation improvements between the U.S Mexican border would yield $1.8 billion and 
$1.4 billion per year in welfare gains to the Mexican and U.S. economy respectively. The 
latter study estimates that a reduction in trade transactions costs of about 1% of the value 
of world trade would yield aggregate welfare gains of some $40 billion.    
 
MENA and Trade Facilitation 
Though work on the quantitative impact of trade facilitation is gaining importance, very 
limited quantitative work has been undertaken for the MENA region. Anecdotal evidence 
(and individual country analyses) on trade facilitation situation in MENA countries does 
however point to the need for improvements. Customs procedures in many MENA 
countries are noted to be burdensome, due to: several documentary requirements; 
multiple agencies with duplicative roles involved in the clearance process; and subjective 
application of procedures, especially in customs valuation. This causes uncertainty 
amongst traders and leads to significant costs and delays in customs clearance. The 2001 
Investment Climate Assessment for Algeria found that it takes some 11.7 days to clear 
goods through customs, and in some cases up to 44 days. In Syria, this average is around 
15 days, with the typical firm having waited over 30 days for an imported shipment   8
sometime in the year. Zarrouk (2003) shows that MENA companies spend some 95 
person-days a year dealing with trade transactions and that trading costs, excluding 
customs duties and domestic taxes, average some 10.6% of the value of goods.  These 
trading costs arose from (in descending order): customs clearance, public sector 
corruption, mandatory product standards and certification of conformity, transshipment 
regulation, and entry visa restrictions for business visits. 
Furthermore, weaknesses in the provision of seamlessly integrated multimodal 
transportation system (air, maritime, rail and road) are observed to significantly add costs 
and delays to the trading environment. In the maritime subsector, these weaknesses have 
been attributed to regulations favoring national carriers; restrictions on private sector 
participation; and cumbersome administrative procedures. Road transportation, an 
important conduit for intra-regional trade, also faces significant challenges. Zarrouk 
(2000) reports some of the existing impediments in road transportation to include: 
restrictions on driving foreign trucks on weekends, denial of visa to drivers, foreign 
trucks unloading in a country must return to country of origin without cargo; various 
fiscal charges and surcharges on road transport, and special permit requirements for 
refrigerated trucks. Devlin and Yee (2005) also highlight the fragmented nature of the 
trucking industry in some MENA countries. The importance of having an efficient 
transportation system is all the more important given global trends in sourcing, just-in-
time production, supply chain management, and outward processing trade. For instance, 
it is reported that Tunisia lost a new factory, by a German car part manufacturer, to 
Eastern Europe due to logistic constraints (Muller-Jentsch, 2005). Indeed, awareness of 
the importance of trade facilitation by some MENA countries has already led some trade 




To investigate the impact of regional integration and trade facilitation, this study adopts a  
computable general equilibrium (CGE) methodology. CGE models have been widely 
used in trade policy analysis due to, inter alia, their ability to capture economy wide 
                                                 
4For instance, under Tunisia’s Export Development Project, trade facilitation reforms have led to imported 
goods being cleared from ports in 3 days, compared to 8 days prior to the commencement of the project.    9
interactions. The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model has been one of the 
leading models used in analyzing the impact of multilateral and regional trade 
liberalization schemes, and more recently on second generation trade issues including 
trade facilitation, hence its use for this study. The standard GTAP model is a static, multi-
region, multi-sector, CGE model operating under assumptions of perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale. The behavioral functions describing production and 
consumption decisions are further discussed in appendix 2. Hertel (1997) discusses full 
details of the GTAP model.  
 
However, since there is no explicit sector in the GTAP model capturing trade facilitation, 
modeling trade facilitation, within the GTAP framework is more challenging, nonetheless 
some work has commenced in this area. Following the approach pursued by Hertel, 
Walmsley and Itakura (2001), trade facilitation has been introduced into CGE (including 
GTAP) models via technical progress in trading activities.  According to this approach, 
traded goods incur indirect trade transactions costs (otherwise referred to as “iceberg” 
costs) in proportion to how long their transit is. Longer transit periods are associated with 
higher costs and a melting down of the value of the good. High transit costs may result 
from cumbersome custom procedures, port congestion, poor intermodal transportation 
services etc. Furthermore, low trading volumes as well as distance may result in higher 
transport costs thus contributing to higher trade transactions cost. Hence, improvements 
to trade facilitation will help reduce transit times and associated costs, thereby, leading to 
a lower destination price of the traded goods. However, OECD (2003) argues that this 
“iceberg-type” representation of trade transactions costs (TTC) seems very appropriate 
for indirect cost components such as border clearance times, but does not capture directly 
incurred trade transactions costs such as resulting from costs for providing the necessary 
documentation. In recognition of these shortcomings, Fox et al (2003) and OECD (2003) 
have incorporated trade facilitation into the GTAP model by splitting trade transactions 
costs into two parts: the indirect TTC (iceberg costs) and a tax component, capturing the 
direct TTC.  
This study adopts the Fox et al (2003) and OECD (2003) methodology in estimating the 
effects of trade facilitation. Nonetheless, given the lack of data, it still remains a   10
challenge to be able to estimate what the trade transactions cost is for MENA countries. 
This study uses the results from Zarrouk (2003) survey, which suggest that inefficiencies 
in trade facilitation amount to some 10.6% of the value of traded goods. This amount is 
taken as the total trade transactions cost arising from inefficiencies. However, in order to 
adopt the above methodology we break this into an indirect (iceberg) and a direct TTC 
(tax component). To obtain the iceberg component we adopt Hummels (2001) estimate 
that each day saved in shipping time, in part due to faster customs clearance, is equivalent 
to a 0.5 percentage point reduction in ad valorem tariffs. The results of the Zarrouk 
(2003) survey suggest that average clearance from ports in MENA countries ranges 
between some two to ten days, hence the indirect cost component of the TTC is estimated 
to be 3%. The remaining 7.6% is attributed to the average direct cost component. Given 
the generally higher documentary requirements needed for agricultural goods it is 
assumed that the direct trade transactions cost for agricultural goods is twice that of non-
agricultural goods. Hence the direct TTC for agricultural goods is about 12%, whereas 
that for non-agricultural trade is about 4%.
5 As discussed earlier, the indirect TTC are 
introduced as technical progress in importing.
6  
Data 
The model used for this study draws data from the GTAP 6 Data base. Although this 
version of the GTAP database allows for 87 regions and 57 commodities, its coverage of 
MENA is rather limited. The database has separate data for Morocco and Tunisia, while 
the rest of MENA is aggregated into “the rest of North Africa” (RONAF), and “the rest 
of the Middle East” (ROMIDE). The current study uses a 13 region by 16 commodity 
aggregation, which captures all the MENA sub-regions, key trading partners and key 
commodities. Details of the aggregation are provided in appendix 3 table A1.  
Trade (imports plus exports) is important for the various MENA sub-regions, with its 
                                                 
5 The direct TTC are incorporated into the analysis by using the “Altertax” option within GTAP to adjust 
the benchmark trade duties accordingly. 
6 Changes are made to the “ams” variable in the GTAP model.   11
 
share of GDP ranging from 43% in the rest of North Africa to about 100% in Tunisia 
(figure 3). With regards trading partners, the EU is the most important one, accounting 
for up to 70% of Tunisia’s trade. The “Rest of the Middle East” shows a somewhat more 
diversified structure in its direction of trade, with the EU accounting for less than 22% of 
exports as well as imports (further details in appendix3 tables A2 and A3). 
 
 Simulations: 
Two types of simulations are performed. The first considers the impact of a MENA free 
trade area, similar to GAFTA, by abolishing all import tariffs existing between MENA 
countries. The second simulation considers the impact of a free trade area between 
MENA and the EU, by abolishing all import tariffs on non-agricultural goods and 
reducing all agricultural tariffs by 50%, thereby reflecting the lower degree of 
liberalization in agriculture under the EMAs. The second experiment thus encompasses 
the first. For both simulations, the counterfactual simulation with and without trade 
facilitation (TF) improvements is undertaken. The trade facilitation improvements were 
applied to all tradeables, except oil, gas and petroleum products. Hence, in total, four 
simulations are implemented: 
•  MENA free trade without trade facilitation (GAFTA) 
•  MENA-EU free trade without trade facilitation (GAFTAEU) 
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•   MENA free trade with trade facilitation (GAFTA+TF) 
•  MENA-EU free trade with trade facilitation(GAFTA-EU+TF) 
 
Results and Discussion: 
Non-Trade Facilitation FTA simulations 
 
The welfare gains to MENA from implementing the free trade agreements are positive.  
Under GAFTA, the total static welfare gains to MENA amounts to $913 million, a 0.1% 
boost to regional income. Under GAFTAEU, the static welfare gains to MENA increase 
to some $1.84 billion, a 0.21% boost to regional income. These results show that 
integration with the EU provides significantly greater welfare gains than only intra-
MENA trade. This is mainly due to the much larger size of the EU market and the greater 
importance of EU trade compared with intra-regional trade.  
The distribution of the welfare gains however reveal marked differences in gains to trade 
liberalization between the various MENA sub-regions. Under GAFTA, Tunisia gained 
the most with a 0.53% increase in welfare, followed by relatively less substantial gains to 
the Rest of the Middle East (0.13%), Morocco (0.05%) and the Rest of North Africa 
(0.05%) (figure 4). Under GAFTAEU, both Morocco (1.88%) and Tunisia (1.72%) 
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Figure 4: Welfare increase from liberalization with the EU is significantly higher than liberalization just 
within GAFTA for most MENA countries (%)
GAFTA GAFTAEU  13
results between each of the MENA sub-regions are in general proportional with the 
degree of trade expansion (Figure A1). For instance, Morocco, which had the highest 
expansion in trade (exports and imports) under GAFTAEU, also recorded the highest 
welfare gains. Whereas “the rest of the Middle East”, which had the least expansion in 
trade also had the least increase in welfare (0.11%). Furthermore, the EU accounts for at 
least 55% of trade with the other MENA sub-regions, other than the “the rest of the 
Middle East”, thereby accounting for the higher welfare gains accruing to Morocco, 
Tunisia and “the rest of North Africa”.  It is important to recognize that ROMIDE 
includes a heterogenous group of countries e.g. Jordan, Iran and Saudi Arabia (dominant 
economy), hence the results for each country within the group are likely to vary greatly. 
Based on the earlier results, it is reasonable to expect ROMIDE countries with a high 
share of trade with the EU will do much better than those that trade less with the 
ROMIDE.   
 
As with welfare, real GDP rises in both simulations for all the MENA sub-regions, 
ranging from 0.02% to 0.21% under GAFTA, and 0.12% to 2.22% under GAFTAEU 
(figure 5). Similarly, Tunisia gains the most under GAFTA, and under GAFTAEU both 
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 Figure 5: GDP increase from liberalization  with the EU is significantly higher than liberalization just 
within GAFTA ….
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that the increase in GDP accrue from only the static gains to trade reforms, as the model 
does not take into account the dynamic gains, which could be even higher than the static 
gains.
7 Nonetheless, the increase points to an increase in economic activity, with 
concomitant favorable effects on factor markets. Not surprising, real wages (skilled and 
unskilled) increase in all MENA sub-regions in line with the GDP increase. For e.g. 
under the GAFTA-EU FTA both Morocco and Tunisia experience real wage increases 
between 5% and 7% (figure 6); the increase is more modest (0.3% to 1%) under GAFTA 
(figure 7).  The rise in real wages is consistent with the fact that most MENA countries 
have comparative advantage in labor intensive goods. Hence liberalization of the trade 
regime should encourage the production of more labor intensive products thus leading to 
a relatively higher demand for labor and a rise in real wages.  Given that the model 
adopts a full employment closure, it is reasonable to expect that the higher real wages 
would translate to increased employment. Hence the employment effects from the 
GAFTAEU are likely to be significantly higher than from only GAFTA. Similarly, rents 
on capital also increase under both simulations thus pointing to the prospects of increased 
investment (foreign and domestic) and potential dynamic gains from trade; these gains 
are however not captured in this model, since it is a static model.  
 
 
                                                 
7Romer, P. (1993) shows that the benefits of an open trade orientation could be potentially higher than the 
static gains. In his growth model, Romer shows that a greater variety of inputs does more for production 
than higher quantities from a limited range. 
Romer, P.M (1993) ‘Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy’. Journal Economic Literature vol. 31 
(1), pp 276-278.  
 





Figure 6: Increase in demand for factors resulting from trade liberalization (GAFTAEU) is reflected in
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Figure 7: Increase in demand for factors resulting from trade liberalization (GAFTA) is reflected in 
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Trade Facilitation 
The results confirm the significant gains to be realized in complementing trade 
liberalization with trade facilitation improvements. The addition of trade facilitation 
improvements to trade liberalization within GAFTA increases overall welfare gains to the 
MENA region from $913 million to some $3 billion (some 0.1% increase to base GDP), 
some three times. Similarly, the welfare gains under trade liberalization within 
GAFTAEU increases from $1.8 billion to $7.2 billion (0.82% increase to base GDP), 
some four times with the inclusion of trade facilitation improvements.  
 
As regards the distribution of the gains, all the various MENA sub-regions share in the 
significant welfare gains. Welfare gains to Morocco, RONAF, and ROMIDE, regions 
which had small welfare gains under GAFTA, are shown to at least triple when GAFTA 
is complemented with trade facilitation; in Tunisia the welfare gains almost doubled 
(figure 8). Similar significant benefits to the MENA regions are also observed when 
GAFTAEU is complemented with trade facilitation improvements (figure 8). In both 
cases, the expansion in trade is proportional to the improvements in welfare, however, the 
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Figure 8: Trade Facilitation improvements significantly increase the welfare gains from 
liberalization…..
without Trade Facilitation with Trade Facilitation
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trade changes by less than 5 percentage points (or less than 30%) under GAFTAEU yet 
the welfare triples, thus suggesting that the channels through which trade facilitation 
impacts welfare go beyond increased trade. Decomposition of the welfare gains shows 
that most of the gains arise from allocative efficiency gains (the terms of trade effects are 
negative) under GAFTAEU+TF.  
Further decomposition of the welfare gains indicates that trade facilitation improvements 
from lowering indirect trade transactions costs tend to contribute more to the welfare 
gains than from the reductions in direct trade transactions costs.
8 For instance, some 83% 
of the additional welfare increase resulting from including trade facilitation 
improvements to GAFTAEU resulted from reduction in the indirect trade transactions 
costs. Similar dominance of the impact of lowering indirect trade transactions costs over 
direct costs is also obtained in OECD (2003). These results point to the importance of 
addressing issues such as cumbersome customs procedures, port congestion, and poor 
intermodal transportation services, all of which, inter alia, add to the indirect trade 
transactions costs.   
 
Summary and Policy Recommendations 
This study highlights the importance of RTA’s and trade facilitation improvements to 
welfare and GDP growth prospects. Both intra-regional integration and integration with 
the EU are observed to have a favorable impact on trade, growth and welfare in the 
MENA region. The welfare gains obtained from integrating with the EU are observed to 
be at least twice as much as that from integrating only with GAFTA, thus pointing to the 
importance of enhanced trade with the EU. The distribution of the welfare gains are 
however skewed in favor of MENA countries that already have a high proportion of trade 
with the EU. This significant increase in welfare resulting from further integration with 
the EU calls for the need to address constraints that hinder the realization of the full 
benefits of trade with the EU. These include difficulties in meeting standards and 
technical regulations, rules of origin, and rigidities in domestic markets. The static gains 
from intra-MENA trade are also positive, though less than that from integration with the 
EU. We anticipate that the dynamic gains to be generated from increased investment 
                                                 
8The decomposition was done using the sub-totals facility in GTAP.   18
flows to a free trade area amongst MENA countries to be more substantial than the static 
gains, and to reinforce deeper integration with the EU. Thereby underscoring the 
importance of addressing the various policy-induced constraints to intra-regional trade 
(see section on FTA’s in MENA).    
Incorporation of trade facilitation improvements are also observed to at least triple the 
welfare gains compared to the scenario without trade facilitation, thus pointing to the 
substantial gains to be realized by MENA countries in addressing existing inefficiencies 
in trade facilitation, in particular those arising from high indirect trade transactions costs. 
Given the existing evidence on the status of trade facilitation in the MENA region, it 
would appear that significant gains could be reaped from streamlining cumbersome 
custom procedures including customs valuation and import requirements on standards 
and technical regulations. Modernizing customs and adhering to WTO disciplines on 
customs valuation, import licensing, technical barriers to trade (TBT), and sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards (SPS) may be a first step in this direction. Furthermore, 
addressing port congestion and improving transshipment regulation including the 
facilitation of a seamlessly integrated multimodal transportation system should yield high 
dividends.    19
References  
 
Al-Atrash, H. and T. Yousef (2000), Intra-Arab Trade: Is it too Little?, IMF Working 
Paper WP/00/10. 
 
Brockkmeier, M. (2001), A Graphical Exposition of the GTAP Model, GTAP Technical 
Paper No. 8. 
 
Brown, D., Deardoff, A., and R. Stern (1997), “Some Economic Effects of the Free Trade 
Agreement between Tunisia and the European Union”, in Galal, A., and B. Hoekman 
(eds), Regional Partners in Global Markets: Limits and Possibilities of Euro-Med 
Agreements, London: Center for Economic Policy Research. 
 
Daniel Muller-Jentsch (2005), Deeper Integration and Trade in Services in the Euro-
Mediterranean Region, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
 
Darrat, A., and A. Pennathur (2002), Are the Arab Countries Really Integratable ? Some 




Denise Eby Konan & Keith E Maskus, 1997. "A Computable General Equilibrium 
Analysis of Egyptian Trade Liberalization Scenarios," Working Papers 199701, 
University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. 
 
Devlin, Julia and Peter Yee (2005), “Trade Logistics in Developing Countries: The Case 
of the Middle East and North Africa”. The World Economy, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 435-456, 
March 2005. 
 
Fink, Carsten, Aaditya Matoo and Cristina Ileana Neagu (2002). “ Trade in International 
Maritime Services: How Much Does Policy Matter?” World Bank Economic Review 
v16, nl (2002):81-108. 
 
Fox, A., Francois, J., and P Londono-Kent (2003), Measuring Border Crossing Costs and 
their Impact on Trade Flows: The United States-Mexican Trucking Case, GTAP resource 
No 1282. Available at:  
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=1282. 
 
Hertel, T (1997), Global Trade Analysis, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hertel, T., Walmsley, T. and K., Itakura (2001), Dynamic Effects of the “New Age” Free 
Trade Agreement between Japan and Singapore. 
 
Hertel, T. and R. Keeney (2005) “What’s at stake: the relative importance of import 
barriers, export subsidies and domestic support”, in Anderson, K. and T. Hertel (eds), 
Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda. 
   20
Hummels, D. (2001). “Time as a Trade Barrier”. Department of Economics, Indiana: 
Purdue University, Mimeo. 
 
Konan, D (2003), “Alternative Paths to Prosperity: Economic Integration among Arab 
Countries”, in Galal, A. and B. Hoekman (eds), Arab Economic Integration, Egyptian 
Center for Economic Studies, Cairo and Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 
 
OECD (2003), Quantitative Assessment of the Benefits of Trade Facilitation, OECD 
document TD/TC/WP(2003)31/Final. 
 
Miniesy R.S., J.B. Nugent and T.M. Yousef (2004), “Intra-regional trade integration in 
theMiddle East. Past performance and future potential”, in H. Hakimian and J.B. Nugent 
(eds.) Trade Policy and Economic Integration in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Routledge, London. 
 
Romer, P. (1993) shows that the benefits of an open trade orientation could be potentially 
higher than the static gains. In his growth model, Romer shows that a greater variety of 
inputs does more for production than higher quantities from a limited range. 
 
Romer, P.M (1993) ‘Innovation And Growth In The Global Economy’. Journal 
Economic Literature vol. 31 (1), pp 276-278.  
 
Rutherford, T.,  Elisabet, E., and D. Tarr (2000), “A Free Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and a Representative Arab Mediterranean Country: A Quantitative 
Assessment”, in Hoekman, B. and J. Zarrouk (eds), Catching Up with the Competition, 
The University Press of Michigan.    
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2001), E-Commerce and 
Development Report, UNCTAD: Geneva. 
 
Wilson, J., Mann, C., and T. Otsuki (2004), Assessing the Potential Benefit of Trade 
Facilitation: A Global Perspective, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3224, 
February 2004.  
 
World Bank (2003), Investment Climate Assessment for Algeria. 
 
World Bank (2005), Syrian Investment Climate Assessment: Unlocking the Potential of 
the Private Sector. 
 
WTO (2003), Morocco Trade Policy Review, WTO, Geneva. 
 
Zarrouk, J  (2003), “A Survey of Barriers to Trade and Investment in Arab Countries”, in 
Gala, A. and B. Hoekman (eds), Arab Economic Integration., Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington DC. 
 





















Appendix 1: Regional FTA’s in MENA 
GAFTA 
Though there exist various sub-regional initiatives, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab 
Maghreb Union, and the Mediterranean Free Trade Area, and Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA). In terms of country coverage, GAFTA is the most comprehensive, as it was signed by 
(22) countries on 19 February 1997, under an Arab League initiative, and has been in force since 
1 January 1998.
  The dead line for the full implementation of the free trade area, by the higher 
income Arab countries, is 2005; less developed members have a transition period of up to 2010 to 
fully implement the free trade area. The agreement covers both trade in industrial and agricultural 
goods, however certain exceptions were allowed during the transition period. Under the rules of 
origin, goods are required to have at least 40% of their value added. With the exception of 
Somalia, all members are reported to be implementing the program.  
 
Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (EMA) 
In general, the EMA agreements provide for an asymmetric liberalization of their trade regimes, 
with the EU liberalizing faster. Immediately upon entry into force, the Mediterranean partners 
benefit from duty and quota-free access to the EC markets in industrial goods (this excludes 
processed agricultural products). The Mediterranean countries are however expected to fully 
liberalize their trade in industrial goods over a 12-year transition period (15 in the case of Egypt). 
With regards non-industrial goods, reciprocal liberalization is selective; the agreements cover raw 
and processed agricultural and fishery products and include mutual concessions such as, zero 
tariffs, reduced import duties (both within and out of quota), and increased tariff quotas.  The 
rules of origin in these agreements do provide for diagonal cumulation of origin.  
 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) 
GCC was created in 1981 by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. By 1983, a free trade area in goods (agricultural and non-agricultural) had been 
realized. The rules of origin require that for goods to qualify as originating, the value-added be at 
least 40% and the producing plant be at least 51% owned by GCC nationals.  Since the 
establishment of the FTA, efforts have been ongoing to create a customs union; this objective was 
achieved in 2003 (two years before the 2005 dead line) with the adoption of an across-the-board 
common external tariff (CET) of 5%. The adoption of a common currency is envisaged by 2010.  
 
Arab Maghreb Union 
The Arab Maghreb Union was established in 1989 by Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia, with the objective of, inter alia, establishing a free trade area in goods, services and 
factors of production by 1992. A customs union and a common market were envisaged to be 
established by 1995 and 2000 respectively. To date, at least 20 conventions and agreements have 
been signed. Nonetheless, the FTA is yet to be fully established, and integration between 
countries in the regions is weak.  
 
Mediteranean Arab Free Trade Area  
In 2001, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, all of which have an association agreement with 
the EU, initiated the Mediteranean Arab Free Trade Area (MAFTA), otherwise referred to as 
“Aghadir Process”. The process, seeks to, inter alia, create a free trade area amongst member 
countries by 2006. The Aghadir Declaration envisages the new free trade area to be extended to 
the other Arab countries in the Mediterranean.      22
Appendix 2: Model Description 
The detailed equations are provided in Hertel (1997).
9 This appendix describes key 
functional forms used in the main aspects of the model. Production takes place through a 
nested structure. At the top nest, value-added and intermediate inputs are combined in 
accordance with a Leontief production function (i.e. fixed proportions). Value-added is 
formed through combinations of labor (skilled and unskilled), land, natural resources, and 
capital using the CES functional form. Similarly, the CES function is used to form 
intermediate goods through the combination of imported and domestically produced 
goods (Armington assumption). At the lowest nest, imported bundles are formed through 
CES combinations of imported goods from each region.     
On the demand side, there exists a single regional household that collects all incomes and 
spends on private, government, and national savings in accordance with a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function (constant shares). Private and government expenditures are exhausted 
over commodities in accordance with a constant difference elasticity demand system and 
Cobb-Douglass utility function respectively. All savings are used for investment, hence 
investment is savings driven. However, since this is a static model, the investment affects 
the level of economic activity in the current period. Investment funds are allocated across 
regions through a “global bank”, in accordance with the rates of return to capital across 
regions. Transport margins are also derived through another global sector. Whilst capital 
is mobile across sectors and regions, labor is assumed to be immobile across countries.  
Demand equals supply in all markets, however, there may exist a price wedge between 
prices paid by consumers and prices received by producers due to the various forms of 
market interventions (e.g. taxes and subsidies). The availability of such policy variables 
on international trade, makes it possible to simulate the effects of tariff liberalization 
initiatives under Regional Trade Agreements, through changes to import tariffs or export 
subsidies, where applicable. 
                                                 
9 Available at: https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/86.pdf   23
Appendix 3 
 
Table A1. Regional and Commodity Aggregation 
Regions (13)  Commodities (16) 
Morocco, Tunisia, rest of Middle East, 
rest of North Africa, EU, Central and 
Eastern Europe, US, rest of North 
America, Japan, East Asia,  China, rest 
of World,  
food, manufactures, services, oil & gas, apparel, electronic 
equipment, transport and machinery, Fruits and vegetables, 
Communication, sea & air transport, other transport, chemical 
& plastics, petroleum products, textiles, fish and live animals.  
 
Table A2: Direction of Exports (as share of total exports) 
   EU   MOR   TUN  ROMIDE   RONAF 
  RONAM  0.024 0.021 0.011  0.013  0.022
  EU  0.547 0.598 0.705  0.211  0.581
 ROW  0.093  0.11  0.072  0.112  0.103
 MOR  0.003  0  0.005  0.004  0.005
 TUN  0.003  0.004  0  0.001  0.008
  EA  0.046 0.049 0.022  0.191  0.034
 ROMIDE  0.029  0.026  0.03  0.085  0.034
 RONAF  0.007  0.01  0.038  0.005  0.003
  China  0.019 0.017 0.009  0.032  0.01
  US  0.115 0.099 0.066  0.174  0.151
CEEC  0.046 0.013 0.012  0.006  0.014
Japan  0.031 0.037 0.021  0.159  0.023
 EFTA  0.038  0.015  0.01  0.006  0.012
Total  1 1 1  1  1
 
Table A3: Direction of Imports (as share of total imports) 
VALIMPORTS   EU  MOR    TUN   ROMIDE  RONAF 
  RONAM  0.025 0.021 0.011  0.012  0.021
 EU  0.534  0.59  0.698  0.205  0.581
  ROW  0.099 0.123 0.077  0.12  0.107
 MOR  0.003  0  0.006  0.005  0.005
 TUN  0.003  0.005  0  0.001  0.009
  EA  0.047 0.047 0.021  0.192  0.034
  ROMIDE  0.03 0.027 0.032  0.088  0.036
 RONAF  0.007  0.01  0.042  0.006  0.003
  China  0.021 0.017 0.009  0.033  0.01
  US  0.114 0.094 0.063  0.169  0.147
CEEC  0.048 0.014 0.012  0.006  0.014
Japan 0.031  0.037  0.02  0.157  0.022
  EFTA  0.038 0.017 0.009  0.006  0.012
Total  1 1 1  1  1
Source: GTAP database 6   24
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